Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East Cleveland by Langstein, Mark
Boston College Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 7
7-1-1978
Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family:
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
Mark Langstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Housing Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Langstein, Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 19 B.C.L.
Rev. 959 (1978), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol19/iss5/7
CASENOTES
with a securities transaction. A careful analysis of the statutory language of
section 10(b), its legislative history, and the interface between state and fed-
eral regulation of corporate affairs with respect to issues of overall fairness
reveals that the Santa Fe Court's narrow view of section 10(b) was analyti-
cally correct. This narrow view of the scope of section 10(b) was properly
utilized in Santa Fe by the Court in its ruling that claims of unfairness and
breach of fiduciary duty absent allegations of manipulation or deception
are not cognizable under section 10(b).
MARGUERITE A. CONAN
Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East
Cleveland` — in 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore resided in her East Cleveland home
with her son, Dale Moore, Sr., and two grandsons, Dale Moore, Jr. and
John Moore, Jr. The two boys were first cousins, John being the sun of
Mrs. Moore's other son, John Moore, Sr. 2 East Cleveland had a zoning or-
dinance which limited residence in any single dwelling unit to a single fam-
ily.' This ordinance was unusual in that it defined the term "family" so as
to include only a few categories of related individuals. Cohabitation by in-
dividuals related as first cousins was not one of these permitted categories,
and consequently, the Moore household fell outside the ordinance's defini-
tion of a single family. 4
Mrs. Moore was convicted of violating the zoning ordinance in the
East Cleveland Municipal Court, 5
 and her subsequent appeals to the Court
of Appeals of Ohio8 and the Supreme Court of Ohio' were unsuccessful.
' 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 496-97.
3 CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND, HOUSING CODE § 1341.08 (1966). Section 1341.08 provides:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of
the household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a
single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the'nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such un-
married children have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(d) Nofwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may
include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nomi-
nal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the house-
hold and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. For the
purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who has more than fifty
percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head of the
household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
Section 1341.08 excludes many other relational combinations from the ambit of the
term "family." For example, households consisting of two brothers or an aunt residing with
her niece, cannot occupy a single dwelling unit.
a 431 U.S. at 497. Upon Mrs. Moore'S refusal to remove John Moore, Jr. from her
household, the city filed a criminal complaint, charging her with violation of the zoning ordi-
nance. Mrs. Moore stipulated to the facts underlying the complaint and was fined twenty-five
dollars and sentenced to five days in prison. Id.
"City of East Cleveland v. Moore, No. 33888 (Ct. App. Ohio July 18, 1975).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-896 (Ohio Nov. 28, 1975).
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However, the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision with
four justices concurring in a plurality opinion, reversed her conviction.°
Justice Powell, author of the plurality opinion, reasoned that an ordinance
which restricts residence within a dwelling unit to nuclear family members
impermissibly violates an extended family's interest in living together, and
thus, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.°
This casenote will first attempt to explain Justice Powell's opinion in
Moore by comparing and contrasting his analysis with the analysis in two
major lines of substantive due process decisions: one involving family inter-
ests and the other involving privacy interests. It will be submitted that
neither of these two lines of decision provides direct support for Justice
Powell's opinion, and consequently, that Moore represents a significant ex-
pansion in the scope of substantive due process. In this light, this casenote
will consider the ramifications of Moore on the' further development of sub-
stantive due process interests by the Ginn. Finally, this casenote will con-
clude with a discussion of Justice Powell's standard of review in Moore, con-
trasting it with standards of review employed by the Court in earlier sub-
stantive due process cases.
1. POWELL'S OPINION IN MOORE
Justice Powell began his analysis in Moore by noting that the East
Cleveland ordinance not only prescribed permissible living arrangements
between unrelated individuals, but went further and regulated biologically
related individuals as well. As such, Justice Powell reasoned, the ordinance
8 431 U.S. at 506. Mr. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in an opin-
ion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, found it unnecessary to reach the substantive
due process issues addressed by Justices Powell, Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun. He pointed
out that the Court has upheld the validity of zoning ordinances regulating permissible prop-
erty uses or limiting occupancy to single housekeeping units. Justice Stevens noted that ordi-
nance provisions limiting occupancy solely to related individuals, however, often have been
struck down as a deprivation of the home owner's property without due process of law. Id. at
514-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). He further observed that such provisions often seek to con-
trol community transience, and that the majority of reviewing courts have upheld this class of
ordinance only where it is genuinely targeted at maintenance of community stability. Id. at
519. Since he viewed the present ordinance as neither aimed at restriction of transience nor
reasonably related to any other asserted justification, he concluded that the provision imper-
missibly restricted the property owner's legitimate prerogatives, and hence deprived him of
property without due process of law. Id. at 520-21. Justice Stevens cited the traditional stan-
dard set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (zoning ordinances
constitutional unless "clearly arbitrary•and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"). 431 U.S. at 520-21.
Justices Stewart and White dissented on the ground that the standard of review applied
was inappropriate. In his opinion, Justice White agreed that the interests of Mrs. Moore were
entitled to some constitutional protection, but would have upheld the proscriptive ordinance
because it is not without any purpose or utility. Id. at 550. In a separate dissenting opinion,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that the interest of Mrs. Moore in living
with her grandson was not entitled to substantive protection. Id. at 537.
Chief Justice Burger also dissented, but on the ground that Mrs. Moore had failed to
exhaust the available administrative remedies. Id. at 521.
Id. at 505-06.
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regulated not merely abstract living arrangements, but rather, the• very
structure of family life. ] ' Pointing to a long line of decisions under the due
process clause shielding the family from intrusive state regulation, Justice
Powell concluded that the right of a family to reach its own choice concern-
ing living arrangements was an interest meriting constitutional protection."
Since the East Cleveland ordinance sliced deeply into the family structure,
Justice Powell determined that the usual judicial deference to the legis-
lature was inappropriate. Accordingly, he felt constrained to "examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the
extent to which they are served by the challenged [governmental] regula-
tion.' Inspection of the ordinance revealed that it had only a tenuous rela-
tionship to alleviation of the conditions to which it was addressed: over-
crowding, parking and traffic congestion, and the fiscal burden on the
school system." justice Powell thus concluded that the Moores' interest in
coresidence outweighed these governmental interests and that the ordi-
nance violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
In reaching his decision, Justice Powell first had to distinguish an ear-
lier opinion involving a similar city ordinance, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas." Belle Terre involved a group of college students coresiding in a vil-
lage which consisted solely of single family. residences. A zoning ordinance.
restricted occupancy to related individuals or no more than two unrelated
individuals per dwelling unit." The Belle Terre Court held that the ordi-
nance violated neither the due process clause nor the equal protection
clause of the constitution.' 7
 Justice Powell distinguished Belle Terre by not-
ing that whereas the ordinance sustained in Belle Terre was directed solely
against dwelling occupancy by more than two unrelated individuals, the
East Cleveland ordinance restricted not only the classes of residency by un-
related individuals, but also the classes of blood relations who could per-
missibly occupy a dwelling unit." Thus, the ordinance directly interfered
with a family's interest in structuring its own living arrangements.
Justice Powell's decision to accord protection under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the family interests at issue in
Moore is the essential and unique feature of that decision. Although the
Court previously had accorded certain aspects of family life substantive
protection under the due process clause,'' the Court never had explicitly
confronted the particular question raised in Moore—whether an extended
family enjoys a constitutionally protected right to reside together in the
same dwelling. As Justice Powell's opinion pointed out, previous decisions
/d. at 498.
" Id. at 499-500.
" Id. at 499.
" Id, at 499-500,
4 Id. at 505-06.
"416 U.S. I (1974).
16 Id. at 2. The ordinance defined family as "[o]ne or more persons related by blood,
adoption or marriage, living ... together as a single housekeeping unit .... A number of per-
sons but not exceeding two (2) living , together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family." Id.
"Id. at 7-8.
18 431 U.S. at 498-99.
"See text at notes 27-61 infra.
" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (individual's right to seek abortion); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of parents to prevent conception by use of
contraceptive devices). 961
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under the due process clause dealt with matters of childbearing," the
rights of parents to custody of their children," or with parental authority
in matters of child rearing and education." Analogizing from these earlier
substantive due process decisions, all dealing with rights more traditionally
associated with the family, Justice Powell concluded that extended families
have a constitutionally protected right to live together," and are deserving
of substantive protection under the due process clause.
Moore is significant as the first major substantive due process decision
to recognize protected interests outside the limits of either the nuclear fam-
ily24
 or the individual." This expansion of the due process clause may ul-
timately extend to other relationships not previously afforded constitutional
protection. However, as in previous substantive due process cases, the
Moore Court was sharply divided over the limits, and even the existence, of
substantive due process rights." Only four Justices in Moore recognized a
right of blood relatives to live together. This failure to command a majority
of the Court with respect to the invalidity of the ordinance on substantive
due process grounds may signify that the Court is not yet ready to commit
itself to a further expansion of substantive due process.
'  See, e.g, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that unwed fathers are
not suitable to oversee custody of their offspring violative of due process).
"See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state may not prescribe education
beyond eighth grade in contravention of religious beliefs of parents); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents have a right to provide private education for their chil-
dren).
" 431 U.S. at 501.
2.2
 A nuclear family is limited to the parents and their dependent children. In contrast,
an extended family may include the nuclear family grouping, non-dependent children and
other blood relations. For examples of cases in which the Court recognized certain consti-
tutionally protected rights in the context of the nuclear family see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish parents to limit the secular education of their children) and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to provide private education
for their children).
"See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (individual's right to seek abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state may not deny an individual access to contracep-
tive devices).
26
 Substantive due process analysis was used widely by the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to analyze the substantive content of legislation to
discover whether it was restrictive of constitutionally protected liberties. It was most commonly
employed to strike down governmental attempts at social legislation, see, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), or business regulation, see, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270
U.S. 402 (1926). However, in these early days the Court occasionally utilized substantive due
process analysis to secure personal liberties as against governmental interference. Thus, in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held invalid state attempts to prohibit the
instruction of German in educational arrangements.
Substantive due process analysis should be distinguished from procedural due process
analysis. In the latter case, judicial examination of legislation merely seeks to assure that the
state has not occasioned a deprivation of life, liberty or property without affording appropri-
ate procedural safeguards. In contrast, substantive due process analysis scrutinizes the merits
of the governmental act and seeks to supersede the legislature in determining the proper bal-
ance between the state interest and the personal liberty..
The Court began a headlong retreat from use of substantive due process protection of
economic interests in the landmark case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S, 379
(1937), which upheld the constitutional validity of the minimum wage law of the State of
Washington. This began an era in which the Court accorded a presumption of validity to gov-
ernmental action, unless there was no rational basis for the legislation.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U,S, 479 (1965), marked a turning point, with a majority
of the Court participating in what has proved to be the revivification of substantive due pro-
962
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II. MOORE AND EARLIER SUSTANT1VE DUE PROCESS CASES
A. The "Family Rights" Decisions
Just as the future implications of Moore are uncertain, it is unclear
whether past decisions provide strong support for Justice Powell's opinion
in Moore. In concluding that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protects a family's interest in choosing its living arrangements,
Justice Powell ostensibly relied upon earlier substantive clue process cases.
Indeed, the history of' substantive dtie process includes a line of decisions,
stemming from Meyer v. Nebraska, 27 which recognized "family" rights. Care-
ful examination of these cases, however, reveals that Powell's opinion in
Moore did not merely restate principles announced in these decisions, but
rather, recognized principles only hinted at in the earlier cases.
Meyer was the first of these substantive due process decisions to accord
parental rights a special constitutional status. Meyer overturned a statute
that forbade any teaching in a language other than English in the first
eight grades of public or private schools." The Meyer Court noted that
parents have a natural duty to provide education for their offspring and to
.make choices concerning the child's education, including his education in
foreign languages." it also found that the statute impermissibly interfered
with the right of the teacher to pursue his livelihood. 3 " Based on the com-
bined deprivations of the teacher and the parents, the Court concluded
that the statute as applied was "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to
any, end within the competency of the state," 3 ' and therefore constituted an
impermissible intrusion upon the prerogatives of parental control and the
interest of the teacher in his livelihood. 32
Although the Meyer Court's reasoning with respect to the protection
afforded parental rights was inarticulate, this newly forged right was reaf-
firmed and given substance in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 33 In Pierce, the
Court considered the validity of an Oregon statute which prohibited the
education of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen in any facility
other than a public school." The appellees were private schools which
cess in protecting certain personal rights and liberties. Under this modern approach the Court
.
first seeks to ascertain whether governmental action has- impinged upon an important liberty
interest which is either explicit in the constitution or otherwise demonstrable, Having made
that threshold determination, the Court then either weighs the nature and extent of the intru-
sion against the asserted liberty interests, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70
(1965), or measures the asserted state justifications against a fixed standard, we Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). Contemporary substantive due process analysis has heretofore
been confined to protecting the rights of parents to supervise the upbringing of offspring, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
165-67 (1965), and guaranteeing the vaguely defined interests loosely gathered under the
right to privacy, see Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
" 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25
 1919 Neb. Laws Ch. 249 (no longer in force). The defendant, a language teacher,
had been convicted under the statute of teaching German to young children. 262 U.S. at
396.97.
" 262 U.S. at 400.
3°
 Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
"Id. at 400.
33 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
a* 1922 Or. Laws § 5259 (no longer in force).
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would have been deprived of patronage by operation of the statute. 35 Ini-
tially, the Pierce Court noted that the statutory, mandate of public educa-
tion destroyed the appellees' business property without due process of law
"through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants [sought to exer-
cise] ... over present and prospective patrons of their schools. " 36 However,
the Court also found a second due process violation in Pierce based upon
the "doctrine" established in Meyer. As the Court stated,
the Act [at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.... The child is not the mere crea-
ture of the State; . those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."
Although dealing with different factual situations, the Court in both
Meyer and Pierce, in finding a substantive constitutional violation under the
due process clause, considered the rights of parents to make decisions re-
specting the guidance of their offspring as well as the economic interest of
the educator. In Meyer, the Court recognized parental rights when those
rights were joined with another constitutionally cognizable interest: the
teacher's right to teach and the parent's right to engage him." Similarly,
the Pierce Court afforded constitutional recognition to parental rights only
in conjunction with the property rights asserted by the private schools. 39
Thus, in both Meyer and Pierce, the Court afforded substantive protection to
parental decisions only when the parental interests were coupled with the
traditional right to pursue one's livelihood." Therefore, neither Meyer nor
Pierce can be said to hold that a family has a constitutionally protected right
to make certain decisions regarding its lifestyle. Although Meyer and Pierce
hinted at the existence of such a right, Moore clearly solidifies these hints in
an explicit statement.
In addition to Meyer and Pierce, Justice Powell purported to find sup-
port for his opinion in two other cases which merely hinted at the existence
of a family's right to make certain lifestyle decisions. In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,'" the Court was confronted with a claimed violation of parental and
religious liberties engendered by a Massachusetts statute regulating child
labor." Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, had assumed guardianship of her
35 268 U.S. at 531-34.
"Id. at 535.
37 Id. at 534-35.
38 262 U.S. at 400.
39 268 U.S. at 534-35.
" The decisions in Meyer and Pierce were delivered during the era of protection of eco-
nomic interests under the due process clause, best characterized by Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). See note 26 supra. The Court's recognition of economic interests, however, was
not its only consideration. The acknowledged importance of education and the family's tra-
ditional role in directing the child's education also may have induced the Court in Meyer and
Pierce to protect the family's interest in making certain decisions about its lifestyle. The Meyer
Court stated, "Whe American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted." 262 U.S.
at 400. Similarly, the Pierce Court noted that "[Ole fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 268 U.S. at 535.
" 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
42
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, § 80-81 (West 1971).
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niece, also a Jehovah's Witness. 43 Prince was convicted of violating a child
labor statute because she permitted her niece to sell copies of a religious
publication. 44
 The Supreme Court sustained Prince's conviction, but also
noted the importance of the parental interests involved:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.... And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter. 43
However, in affirming Prince's conviction, the Court held that her interest
in the religious proseletyzing activities of the child must yield to the state's
overriding interest as parens patriae in the protection of the minor citizen's
welfare and safety. 4 °
As in Meyer and Pierce, the Prince Court examined the substantive due
process aspect of parental rights only in conjunction with other consti-
tutionally protected interests, in this instance the first amendment right to
religious freedom." Thus, although there were no protectable due process
property rights in Prince, as there were in Meyer and Pierce, the Court seem-
ingly recognized parental rights only because a first amendment right was
also at stake."
The final case in the area of parent-child protection cited by Justice
Powell in Moore, Wisconsin v. Yoder," dealt with a parent's right to resist the
effects of a state compulsory education law. In Yoder, Amish parents were
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance lawn by
withdrawing their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, from public school
after they finished eighth grade." The Amish religion holds as a tenet that
formal public education beyond eighth grade exposes Amish children to
undesirable worldly influences and endangers the salvation of both parent
1 ' 321 U.S. at 161-62. The fact that the relationship in Prince was one of guardian-ward
rather than parent-child is irrelevant. The Court consistently phrased the interests at issue as
if the relationship were one of parent-child when speaking of' the due process claim; for ex-
ample: "One [liberty] is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for
appellant means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith." Id. at 164.
"Id. at 159-60. Of course, distribution of religious material, absent an interest of the
state as substantial as that in Prince, normally comes within the ambit of first amendment pro-
tection. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1943); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
45
 321 U.S. at 166. The defendant relied upon both the first amendment claim of free-
dom of religion, and a substantive due process claim based upon Meyer. Id. at 164. The Court
appeared to say that the merits of the substantive due process claim were dependent upon the
first amendment: "The due process claim, as made and perhaps necessarily, extends no
further than that to freedom of religion, since in the circumstances all that is comprehended
in the former is included in the latter." Id. at 164 n.8.
If this is the proper explanation of Prince, then it appears consistent with the conclusion
that Meyer and Pierce do not encompass constitutional protection of the family's interests ab-
sent other constitutionally protected interests. See text and note 39 supra
" 321 U.S. at 166. The overriding state interest noted by the Court was regulation of
child labor and protection of the child from perceived evils of the "street." Id. at 168-69.
IT hi.
"Id. at 164 n.8.
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 1973).
" Each defendant was fined a sum of five dollars. 406 U.S. at 208.
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and child.52 The Amish community was concerned that the extensive.expo-
sure to secular mores in public high school education would encourage im-
pressionable children to stray from the fold. 53 The defendants contended
that the provision in the law requiring compulsory education until age six-
teen54 ran afoul of the first amendment, as well as the parental preroga-
tives explicated in the line of cases extending from Meyer. 55
In distinguishing Yoder from Prince, the Supreme Court noted that the
Old Order Amish community was an inextractable synthesis of lifestyle and
religion, which would be affected severely by the state-mandated secular
change. 55 The Court also considered the informal vocational education
which the Amish provided for a period of years beyond the eighth grade,
balancing it against the marginal benefits of requiring the children to at-
tend at most two more years of formal education." Reasoning that this
period was essential for the successful integration of Amish children into
the Amish agrarian existence," the Court found that this interlude satisfied
both the child labor laws and the compulsory education acts by keeping
children under certain ages in school and out of the labor market." There-
fore, the Amish system of child rearing outweighed the state concerns and
merited an exemption from the Wisconsin statute."
The factual setting of Yoder leaves in doubt the precise basis of the
Court's judgment. The Yoder Court balanced first amendment rights, edu-
cational choices and parental considerations concerning child rearing
against the state interests underlying compulsory education." Careful read-
ing of Yoder, however, suggests that the decision was rooted primarily in
the religious considerations, and that parental rights were tangential to the
Court's holding. 52 Thus, the parental rights acquired significance in Yoder
only because first amendment interests were present as well.
The common thread of Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and Yoder is the judicial
deference accorded to parental decisions concerning the care, upbringing
and nurture of children when weighing state interests against such deci-
sions. However, the Court in these cases accorded deference to parental
decision only because of the simultaneous presence of other constitutionally
protected interests: the first amendment in Prince and Yoder, and economic
"Id. at 209.
"Id. at 218.
" Wts. STAT. ANN. 118.15(1)(a) (West 1973).
35 406 U.S. at 231-34.
"Id. at 216-19.
57 1d. at 224-25.
"Id. at 211-12.
"Id. at 228.
"Id. at 234-36.
"Id. at 214. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in Yoder, suggested that the majority's
inclusion of parental rights into the decisional mix was misplaced. Id. at 241. He argued that
consideration of only the parental choice of religion incorrectly presumed that the children
would concur in their parents' religious preferences. Douglas urged that "lw]here the child is
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views." Id. at 242.
" The Court stated in Yoder, "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not
be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations." Id. at 215. This seemingly confirms that the Court will not vindicate
parental rights alone. Rather, before parents can mount a successful challenge under the due
process clause to state interference with parental rights, a nexus must be sketched to indepen-
dent, important constitutional interests—in this case, religion.
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rights in Meyer and Pierce. Accordingly, the decisions in the Meyer family of
cases balanced not only the parental decisions being challenged, but all the
constitutional interests involved, against the state justifications asserted. In
contrast, Justice Powell's opinion in Moore recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected right of a family to live together even without other, supporting con-
stitutional interests."
•	 Justice Powell significantly expanded Meyer and its progeny in yet
another way. The holdings in the cases from Meyer through Yoder applied
only to parental rights concerning child raising and did not consider the
family's right to decide whether to live in an extended family or nuclear
family setting. Thus, even though the Prince Court spoke broadly of a "pri-
vate realm of family life which the state may not enter," 64 it did so only in
the context of a parent or guardian controlling a child's upbringing. The
substantive due process protection afforded by Justice Powell's opinion in
Moore went beyond this limited context. His opinion did not deal with Mrs.
Moore's right to guide the upbringing of her grandchildren, the functional
equivalent of the rights recognized in Meyer, Pierce, Prince and Yoder. That
right was not directly at issue" and, in any event, such a right could have
been exercised regardless of whether the extended family lived together.
Rather, the rights at issue in Moore were the right of a family to reside to-
gether, the right to provide the most beneficial milieu for familial life, and
the right to provide care and aid to all family members in need."
B. The Privacy Decisions
The other major area, apart from that of "family rights," in which
the Court recently has utilized the mechanism of substantive due process, is
the privacy area. Increasingly, constitutionally protected notions of privacy
have bulwarked sensitive areas of daily life from state interference. The
landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut" marks the genesis of this pro-
tection.
" 431 U.S. at 505-06. It is possible that the right not to be deprived of property without
procedural due process and the first amendment right to associate constitute unarticulated
conjoined interests supporting the right of the family to live together. See note 8 supra, for
Justice Stevens' explanation of the procedural due process issue. However, Justice Powell's
opinion failed to mention these interests.
" 32l U.S. at 166.
" The closest justice Powell came to equating the situation in Moore, where the issue
was the state's inteference with a family's living arrangements, with the situation in Meyer,
where the issue was the state's inteference with childraising, occurred in the following remark:
"Decisions concerning child rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce and other cases have recognized
as entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with grandparents or other rela-
tives who occupy the same household—indeed who may take on major responsibility for the
rearing of children." 431 U.S. at 505. Note that even in this context, the family's right to oc-
cupy the same dwelling is antecedent to the parental role. Further, the "parental" role in
Moore may not have been stressed because of the confusing make-up and changing composi-
tion of the Moore household.
" justice Powell noted that many circumstances required extended families to live to-
gether. "feispecially in times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic need, the
broader family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild
a secure home life." Id. at 505.
6 ' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The Moore opinion may, in part, be premised upon the conceptions of
privacy introduced in Griswold and developed by Stanley v. Georgia" and
other cases creating a zone of privacy surrounding family living arrange-
ments which the state may not lightly enter. Justice Powell cited these cases
as having delineated areas of protection parallel to the rights recognized in
Moore." Examination of these decisions, however, indicates the extent to
which the Moore decision actually extended these cases.
The earliest of the privacy decisions, Griswold, involved a Connecticut
criminal statute which prohibited third parties from distributing contracep-
tive information to married individuals." Four separate majority opinions
were written condemning the statute. The common theme underlying the
opinions was the existence of a peripheral zone of privacy, loosely derived
from the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The existence of this
zone of privacy suffices to protect "sensitive areas] of privacy—that of the
marital relation and the marital home" from intrusive state action." Thus,
two themes emerged in Griswold, the privacy of the marital home and the
privacy of the marital relation. 72 Although the theme of the privacy of the
physical home, safeguarded from unlawful governmental trespass, was not
the principal theme in Griswold, the Court noted in passing that the spectre
of the "police ... search[ing] the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives," 73 was constitutionally offensive.
The Court further developed the privacy of the home theme in Stan-
ley v. Georgia," which held that a state statute prohibiting possession of
obscene materials in one's own home violated the fourteenth amendment.
The decision in Stanley was grounded on the premise that certain forms of
unprotected activities remain shielded from state examination so long as
the activity takes place within the confines of a private residence. Although
the state may permissibly regulate public displays or perusal of obscene ma-
terial, legitimate expectations of privacy protect the individual from state
regulation of the private use of obscene material within the home." Thus,
Stanley recognized that special considerations of privacy attach to a person's
residence—the constitutional equivalent of the old adage "a man's home is
his castle." This view of Stanley has been confirmed by subsequent decisions
of the Court in which activities protected from governmental intrusion
when conducted within the home became vulnerable to governmental pros-
ecution when carried beyond the shelter of the domiciliary threshold."
Therefore, the privacy right is at least partially grounded on the notion of
the physical sanctity of the home.
68
 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" 431 U.S. at 499.
7° 381 U.S. at 480.
71 Id. at 495. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
"See Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
670, 687-97 (1973) for a detailed discussion of these themes and their relation to the consti-
tutional concept of privacy developed by the Court. See also Note, Right of Privacy, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1161 (1974).
73 381 U.S. at 485.
7 ' 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
75 See id. at 565.
T" See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973).
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Although Justice Powell's opinion in Moore revolved in part about the
concept of the sanctity of Mrs. Moore's home, his opinion did not explicitly
rest upon protection of the physical privacy of the home as did Stanley."
Stanley recognized the physical sanctity of the home without regard to the
activities taking place within its walls. In contrast to Stanley, Justice Powell's
opinion in Moore, rather than relying solely on protection of the physical
locus, emphasized a protectable interest of family life, the essence of life
within the home." The constitutional violation in Moore, then, was the state
intrusion upon the protected "realm of family life"" coincidentally situated
in the home, not upon the physical locus of the home. Therefore, in Moore,
Justice Powell expanded the concept of privacy recognized in Stanley, trans-
forming it from one centered on the physical situs of the home to one
based on an abstract notion of the sanctity of the family itself.
Justice Powell's theme of family life finds some support in Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman." Poe involved a challenge to the same
statute at issue in Griswold. Justice Harlan, rejecting the plurality's dismissal
for lack of justiciability, addressed the merits. He noted that protection of
family life within the home flowed inevitably from the fourth and four-
teenth amendments' physical protection of the home. 8 ' Justice Harlan
further reasoned that the conduct sought to be proscribed by the statute,
contraceptive usage by married couples, is contained within the concept of
family life, and therefore protected under the fourteenth amendment."
Although Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe provided a basis for the family life
interests protected in Moore, his opinion was•not directed at the same issues
as those in Moore. Thus, even Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe does not fully
support Justice Powell's recognition of certain family interests in Moore.
Similarly, Justice Powell's citation of Eisenstadt v. Baird" is curious
since the case seems unrelated to Justice Powell's concept, of Moore. In
Eisenstadt, a case decided shortly after the cases recognizing the concept of
privacy based on the physical sanctity of the home, the Court embraced a .
broader concept of privacy based on an individual's integrity." Eisenstadt
challenged a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the display or distribution of
contraceptive devices except by pharmacists or physicians." The statute
77
 It may well be that the spectre of the city housing inspector marching into the Moore
living room in order to ascertain a violation of the statute formed an implied basis for Justice
Powell's extension of constitutional protection to family living arrangements. However, his
opinion did not explicitly mention this aspect. Therefore, it is unlikely that the physical intru-
sion of an inspection played more than a tangential role in the decision. As he noted: "here
we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has its
place in the home .... " 431 U.S. at 503 n.12 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
7" 431 U.S. at 503-05.
19 1d. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166).
" 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 551.
"Id. at 551-54.
" 3 405 U,S. 438 (1972).
"Id. at 453. The Eisenstadt Court used an equal protection analysis rather than a sub-
stantive due process analysis in finding a constitutional violation. However, the protection af-
forded in Eisenstadt is based upon privacy constructs and the protection of the individual from
state violation of privacy. See Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 693-97 (1973).
85
 MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, * 21 (West 1970).
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denied unmarried individuals access to contraceptives. The Court, in strik-
ing down the statute, noted that privacy encompasses freedom from "un-
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."" Thus,
Eisenstadt's formulation of protectable privacy interests made it clear that
privacy rights need not depend upon any particular relationship but that
privacy can be individual in nature. 97
Although Justice Powell cited Eisenstadt as support for his opinion in
Moore, the notion of privacy stemming from the integrity of the individual
did not seem to be reflected in his opinion. The plurality in Moore might
have analyzed the interest invaded as inhering within a single person—the
right of Moore to reside with her grandson—rather than as interests har-
bored within family groupings." But Justice Powell's opinion essentially ig-
nored Moore's personal interest in living with her grandchildren. 99 Simi-
larly, the plurality ignored any individual right the grandchild might pos-
sess in continued household residence. Instead, the interests of both
grandmother and grandchild were analyzed together within the familial re-
lationship. The constitutional protection accorded Mrs. Moore derived
from that afforded the Moore family. Thus, it is the preservation of the
family grouping itself that triggered the constitutional protection found in
Moore, and not the right of a particular individual to reside with family
members. Therefore, the theme of individual protection, developed in
Eisenstadt, is inapplicable to Moore. •
Since neither the Meyer theme of parent-child protection nor the Gris-
wold and Stanley themes shielding home or individual from intrusive gov-
ernmental action were precisely applicable to Moore, the Powell decision es-
tablished new themes in order to explicate the protectable interest in the
matter at hand.
C. New Directions in Moore
Inasmuch as the prior decisions of the Court under the due process
clause did not address the precise issue in Moore, Justice Powell's grant of
constitutional protection to the family opens up a new area of substantive
due process. His idea that the family unit is partially immune from obtru-
sive state acts, while conceptually related to the rationale of Meyer and its
progeny is, in fact, very different.
- Having established the existence of the constitutionally protected right
of a family to live together, Justice Powell faced the further question of the
86
 405 U.S. at 453.
87 It is clear that Eisenstadt presents a more expansive view of privacy than Griswold.
There is language in Griswold to the effect that Connecticut could permissibly have regulated
access to contraceptive devices by unmarried people. The Griswold Court appeared to give
more weight to the marital relationship than did the Eisenstadt Court.
" Justice Powell's opinion in Moore talked in terms of family rights rather than individ-
ual rights; for instance, "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." 431 U.S. at
499.
" Necessarily, due to the nature of the criminal offense, Mrs. Moore's tolerance of the
illegal residence of her grandson, the Court addressed the interests of Mrs. Moore alone.
However, as pointed out previously, the bulk of the plurality opinion discussed vindication of
family rights. See text at notes 19.23 supra.
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limits of that right. His opinion makes it clear that the activities protected
within the home do not cease at nuclear family borders: "[t]he tradition of
uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially , grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally de-
serving of constitutional recognition." 90 However, the decision leaves for
future resolution the question how attenuated an extended family relation-
ship can be and still fall within the purview of the protectable interests rec-
ognized by Justice Powell's decision in Moore. 91 Furthermore, nothing in
Justice Powell's opinion in Moore prevents the recognition of the sanctity of
the extended family in other contexts. At a minimum, extended family de-
cisions involving educational and religious choices would appear to be ac-
corded substantial protection from intrusive regulation."'
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The establishment of the family's right to make certain decisions re-
garding living arrangements was only the firSt step in Justice Powell's
analysis of Moore. Since even constitutionally protected rights at times must
yield to state interests, Justice Powell had to review East Cleveland's inter-
ests in prohibiting extended families from living together to see if these
interests outweighed the Moores' interest in residing together.
"431 U.S. at 504. The Court refused to accept the argument that relationships beyond
those of husband-wife, parent-child, or brother-sister are appropriate subjects for extensive
governmental regulation consistent with the due process clause, While the city attempted to
distinguish Moore from Meyer and Pierce by arguing that these decisions at most indicated a
right to live together extending only to the ly:irders of' the nuclear family, Justice Powell's
opinion rejected this contention, stating, "No be sure, [Meyer and Pierce] did not expressly
consider the family relationship presented here But we cannot avoid applying the
force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at 500-
01.
°' In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977) [OFFER], the Court was confronted with a case seeking to extend the horizons of
Moore. OFFER challenged § 383(2) and 400 of the New York Social Services Law authorizing
the removal of foster children from foster homes without a formal proceeding. Although the
Court found that foster families have a limited interest, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, in keeping the foster flintily together,, this interest was constrained by
the contract between foster parent and state. Moreover, any of the foster family's rights must
give way to the superior interest of the natural parents. Id. at 846.47.
The opinion of the Court in OFFER fleshed out the definition of "family" for purposes
'of substantive due process determinations. The Court noted that, "the usual understanding of
'family' implies biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between par-
ent and child have stressed this element." Id. at 843. However, a biological nexus is not always
necessary before the Court will recognize a family unit. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (guardian-ward relationship).
The distinguishing factors dividing family groupings from those with a mere social, political or
economic relationship "stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association ...." OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844. It thus appears that neither Moore nor OFFER
totally forecloses groupings of unrelated individuals from successful defense against state in-
trusion under the fourteenth amendment.
02 Cf Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state may not proscribe religious
and private school education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state may not prohibit
education of children in foreign languages).
Justice Powell implied that uncles, aunts, cousins and grandparents are within the class
of extended family members. 431 U.S. at 504. He Further implied that as relationships become
more remote the family interest diminishes: "the choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to
live together may not lightly be denied by the State." Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
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The City of East Cleveland argued in Moore that the proper standard
of review was the standard for testing city ordinances absent substantive
due process considerations. That test, set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.," requires an ordinance to be upheld as constitutional unless it is
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare."'" Justice Powell refused to
apply such a lenient standard, however, reasoning that "when a city under-
takes such intrusive regulation of the family, ... the usual judicial defer-
ence to the legislature is inappropriate." 98
 Instead, Justice Powell indicated
that the "Court must examine carefully the impokance of the govern-
mental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation."" Although finding the proffered governmental
interests legitimate, Justice Powell concluded that the challenged ordinance
served these interests only marginally, 97 and therefore struck down the or-
dinance as unconstitutional. Justice Powell, however, failed to clearly expli-
cate what standard of review he employed, and he provided no coherent
indication of what weight should be accorded to the competing interests at
stake.
The standard of review in recent due process cases has focused on the
interest underlying the challenged regulation and the nexus between the
interest and the challenged regulation. 88
 Where the interest at issue is af-
forded only a low level of constitutional protection, the state need only
demonstrate that its legislation was intended to serve legitimate state ends
and that some conceivable nexus exists between these interests and the legis-
lation." However, where the interests at issue are accorded more consti-
tutional protection, the state has to demonstrate a correspondingly stronger
interest and a greater nexus between the state interests and the means
chosen to effectuate these interests.'"
Justice Powell's opinion in Moore does not follow this traditional
analysis. He failed to state explicitly how much weight he accorded to the
family interests at stake in Moore, although it is clear that he gave some sub-
stantive weight to these interests. If no substantive weight were afforded to
the Moores' interest, a showing of some rational relation of the regulation
to permissible state interests would have sufficed to sustain the ordinance
under traditional clue process analysis. However, Justice Powell required
more than simply a "rational relation" between East Cleveland's interests
and the ordinance in Moore. The opinion stated that although the unclerly-
93
 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclid standard is essentially a rational relation test in which
the burden is on the challenger not only to prove the constitutional violation but also to show
the arbitrary nature of the governmental action.
" Id. at 395.
95
 431 U.S. at 499.
96 Id.
97
 Id. at 499-500.
55 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down a statute
prohibiting advertisement or display of contraceptive devices and restricting distribution of
such devices except by licensed pharmacist).
"See, e.g., United States v, Carolene Prods. Co„ 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).
1 " See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Connecticut regulation pro-
hibiting funding of non-medically related abortions not an undue burden on right to abortion,
thereby requiring only a low degree of judicial scrutiny).
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ing objectives of the ordinance—preventing overpopulation, alleviating
traffic congestion and monetary burdens upon the education system—were
legitimate prophylactic goals, the East Cleveland ordinance had but a tenu-
ous relation to these goals."' Thus, Justice Powell implied that the Moore
family's interests are sufficiently weighty that East Cleveland must demon-
strate more than a rational relationship between its ordinance and its own
interests before it can permissibly intrude upon those family interests.
Nevertheless, how much substantive weight should be afforded to these
family interests remains unclear. The failure of the Powell opinion
adequately to address this issue deprives the Moore decision of much of its
potential precedential value. This is particularly unfortunate inasmuch as
the federal courts are increasingly confronted with challenges to govern-
mental regulation of the family under the due process clause.
Prior to the decision in Moore, two federal district court decisions had
enunciated a "fundamental right of family integrity" meriting application
of the strict scrutiny means-ends test based upon the issues before the
courts.'" Although the judicial approach employed in Moore is not irrecon-
cilable with the usage of a strict scrutiny test in analyzing state action sub-
stantially disruptive of family unity, Moore does not give guidance to the
lower courts as to the substantive weight to be accorded to family interests
in particular situations.
CONCLUSION
The Moore decision represents a synthesis and extension of both the
family themes of Meyer and its progeny, and privacy decisions commencing
with Griswold. Moore has explicitly set forth a new theme meriting substan-
tive constitutional protection under the due process clause—the integrity of
the family unit and its right to make certain decisions about its lifestyle.
Thus, future state intrusions into this area will be scrutinized carefully by
the Court. Unfortunately, the failure of the Moore decision to specify the
quantum of weight to be accorded the family interests or to delineate
boundaries of its protection of family interests means that the precise di-
mensions of protected family interests must await future decisions.
The explicit recognition of familial rights assures that the Moore deci-
sion will have ramifications in areas where state intrusions into the family
have traditionally been acceptable. Recognition of a fundamental right of
Cl1 431 U.S. at 500.
"See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 21.22 (S.D. Iowa 1975). In Alsager the
court applied strict judicial scrutiny in striking down the Iowa parental termination statute. See
also Roe v. Conn,' 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (applying strict scrutiny in striking
an Alabama summary seizure statute). Impingement of fundamental rights under substantive
due process analysis requires application of a strict scrutiny standard of review akin to that
used in equal protection analysis. Strict scrutiny review requires that once the challenger has
demonstrated infringement of a protected right, the state must demonstrate the existence of a
compelling or overriding state interest in order to justify the invasion. Even if the state can
demonstrate the existence of such an interest, it must further show the non-availability of al-
ternative means less intrusive of the challenger's constitutionally protected interest. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). For the distinction between the use of strict scrutiny
analysis in equal protection and substantive due process analyses, see generally Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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family integrity is likely to have its greatest impact in the areas of custody
proceedings, neglect and dependency determination, parental termination
and state ordered medical treatment. In these areas the state interest in the
protection of the welfare of the child under its exercise of traditional police
powers has long been recognized. In the past these statutes have been held
immune from substantive attack under the due process clause and have
been vulnerable only to challenge for violations of the procedural due pro-
cess guarantees. Recognition of a right of family integrity could require
greater state justification than traditionally required before intrusion into
the family is permissible.
MARK LANGSTEIN
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tion, interpretation, and enforcement.
Covers Supreme Court proceedings,•argu-
ments, actions, filings; decisions of fed-
eral courts of appeal and district courts,
and of principal state courts; Congres-
n FEDERAL CONTRACTS
REPORT .
Supplies you with weekly coverage of U.S.
Government procurement and grant pro-
grams, policies, and regulations; decisions
of Boards of Contract Appeals, Comp-
troller General, Renegotiation Board,
Courts of Claims, Tax Court, and other
courts and agencies; plus federal legisla-
tion affecting the Government and its
contractors and grantees. Indexed.
n BNA's PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
JOURNAL
.Gives you weekly notification, analysis,
and interpretation of important current
developments in these fields; plus full or
partial text of proposed or enacted legis-
lation and treaties; congressional reports;
important court and agency rulings; per-
tinent policy statements and speeches;
Patent and Trademark Office and Copy-
right Office opinions, statements, and
rules. Indexed.
n THE FAMILY LAW
REPORTER
Weekly notification and reference service
on domestic relations; adoption; chil-
dren's rights; abortion; tax aspects; and
much more. Full text of all current state
divorce statutes, and pertinent federal
statutes. Covers latest legislative actions;
litigation results; Supreme Court argu-
ments and filings. You get full text of
Supreme Court decisions and select lower
court opinions. Includes case table and
special monographs on practice-oriented
subjects. Indexed.
For further information, please write or call:
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.
1231 25th St.N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone: 202-452.-4200
REMEMBER DODSON AND FOGG?
(from PICKWICK PAPERS)
Charles Dickens had a low opinion of the legal
eagles whom he himself created and who repre-
sented Mrs. Bardell in her suit against his beloved
Mr. Pickwick. But he faithfully recorded that they
won a verdict for their client.
By the law of average, only fifty per cent of all
attorneys engaged in legal controversies can be on
the side of the angels". The same percentage must
conscientiously and to the best of their abilities
take up the cudgels for the adversaries.
Whether you find yourself on the unpopular side
or not — but particularly if you do — you should
check carefully the cases and statutes you and your
opponent plan to use as precedent. And you should
search most diligently for additional favorable au-
thorities in point.
Our subscribers believe there is no better way to
do this than through Shepard's Citations. May we
show you how?
Write for information
SHEPARD'S CITATIONS
McGRAW-IFII LA-J, Inc.
COLORADO SPRINGS
COLORADO 80901
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A
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THE BOSTON COLLEGE
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW JOURNAL
The foul-not presents analyses by prominent authors of
current international and comparative law topics. International
law subjects include matters of trade and investment, treaties,
state jurisdiction, and the quality of the international law
corpus. The comparative branch of this issue provides studies
of judicial structure, legal philosophy, and specific substantive
legal concerns. Student articles and comments are. also
included.
Volume I to be published June, 1977.
Please address all inquiries to:
The Business Manager
Boston College International and Comparative Law Journal
885 Centre Street
Newton Centre, Massachusetts 02159
Subscriptions: $5.00 per year domestic, $6.00 foreign.
